Mar 24th 2026|SHANGHAI|4 min read
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CHINESE TECHNOCRATS spell out their vision of the future in impenetrable officialese. The 15th five-year plan for China’s economic development, adopted in March, talks of “industrial upgrading”, “new quality productive forces” and the like. Yet in plain language, it translates into Elon Musk’s fever dream: skies dotted with flying taxis; fusion power fuelling factories manned by humanoid robots; unstoppable quantum computers; 6G mobile devices plugged directly into people’s brains.
Past plans also displayed gumption. In 2015 the most high-profile plan in years, dubbed Made in China 2025, set the goal of catching up with America and ending reliance on foreign technology. But catching up, which China has pulled off in areas like electric cars, clean energy and even artificial intelligence, is one thing. Dominating technologies of the future is another.
One reason for this breathtaking ambition is the desire of Xi Jinping, China’s leader, to usher in a “modernised socialist state” by 2035. A modernised Chinese socialist is one generating between $20,000 and $30,000 in economic value per year, up from less than $14,000 today. To meet that goal, itself a step towards China becoming a “modernised socialist world power” by 2049, the centennial of communist rule, GDP per person must grow by 4-8% a year in the next decade. With Chinese consumers in a dour mood and exporters facing geopolitical uncertainty, the party believes only world-beating technology and resulting productivity gains can ensure success.
This requires picking up pace. Whereas earlier plans set distinct objectives for strategic industries and for scientific innovation, industrial policy is now being extended to out-there tech, notes Camille Boullenois of Rhodium, a research firm. The latest plan ordains the commercialisation of fledgling fields like AI robots, hydrogen power and brain-computer interfaces—all in the next five years. Within another five the party wants breakthroughs and “application scenarios” (probably meaning supply chains and clusters) in “frontier technologies” like fusion power and quantum computing, which promise to up-end energy and IT, but have proved hard to crack.
The point of the plan is to signal to officials and investors which initiatives to back. This unlocks funds from central and local governments. Private capital follows, on the assumption state involvement reduces risk. Research clusters attract not just technologists and money, but also marketers, lawyers and other professionals needed to take tech from the lab into markets. Host cities enlist armies of bureaucrats, who develop domain expertise.
Proponents of Chinese techno-planning point to AI as proof that it works for cutting-edge innovation. When in 2017 China declared its intention to enter “the global high-end value chain” for AI by 2025, foreigners scoffed. In January last year Western markets shuddered when DeepSeek, an AI lab, released a model that rivalled top American ones. No one is scoffing at the new goal of turning China into “the world’s primary AI innovation centre”.
Photograph: Shutterstock
Early results in several other areas look encouraging, too. The “low-altitude economy” of delivery drones and flying cabs, born of private-sector ingenuity, took off after catching the attention of officialdom around 2021. State imprimatur for brain-computer interfaces, first named a “future industry” in 2024 and subject of its own plan in late 2025, has led universities to set up research projects and startups to launch products. Cities host specialist industrial zones and hospitals have published pricing guidelines for brain implants.
Scepticism is warranted, however. Earlier plans, including Made in China 2025, missed many goals. China beats the world in renewables tech and electric cars, and matches it in AI, but lags behind in critical areas like advanced chips. Capital ends up wasted if it flows to places in which local officials duplicate efforts elsewhere, chase industries despite a lack of tech talent, or are loth to abandon failures. China’s apparent desire to dominate every emerging industry may spread resources too thinly.
Making a hoo-ha about the plans does not help. Made in China 2025 spooked America, which saw it as a challenge to its techno-economic dominance. It hobbled Chinese efforts in areas like chipmaking by restricting exports of crucial American inputs. There is now no talk of Made in China 2035. But any technology named in the latest plan can still expect a target on its back. Talk of using undefined “unconventional measures” to achieve the plan’s goals will not put American minds at ease.
The biggest challenge for China’s planners is a function of their catch-up successes. Those occurred in fields where the technology (like photovoltaic cells or lithium-ion batteries) had been around for decades and the market (for electricity or cars) was mature. Moving to tech’s bleeding edge involves a lot more unknowns. Is there a business case for hydrogen power? How many people will want brain implants? Can quantum computers and fusion even be made to work outside the lab? China’s plans imply it knows the answers. Market forces may have other ideas. ■
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This article appeared in the Finance & economics section of the print edition under the headline “Xi’s techno-Utopia”
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